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In this study, the influence of analyst presence on underpricing produces a different outcome. We 
discover compelling evidence of the relationship between analyst presence and underpricing of 
IPOs by combining the results of twelve research involving over 20,400 businesses using meta-
analysis. The IPO underpricing grows by 4.9 percent for every one percent increase in analyst 
presence. Furthermore, a meta-regression between impact magnitude and moderator factors 
revealed a substantial and favourable influence of a prominent underwriter in increasing the 
underpricing of the IPO followed by analysts. Our findings are particularly relevant for US market 
IPOs, as reputable underwriters operate as a moderator and considerably influence underpricing, 
calling into doubt the US authorities' control over pre-IPO research and attempts to reduce IPO 
mispricing. However, in emerging markets, underwriter reputation and syndicate have little 
influence on IPO underpricing. 
 




1. Introduction  
 
In addition to the material supplied by the issuer firm in their prospectus for the IPO (initial public 
offering), security analysts supply information to the investors. Analysts' knowledge or signals must 
decrease information asymmetry and assist potential investors in determining the fair price of the IPO 
(Roulstone, 2003) and reduce underpricing (Muscarella and Vetsuypens, 1989). Even yet, 
underpricing is a regular occurrence in the IPO literature. We believe that the presence of analysts 
prior to the IPO listing improves information quality, sending favourable signals to potential investors. 
Their inclusion in the underwriter syndicate before to the IPO increases liquidity for the stock on the 
IPO listing day, albeit at the risk of underpricing or overpricing. 
Underpricing is costly to the issuer business, and the issuer would prefer to avoid it through improved 
discussions with the issue's lead manager. As a result, by employing a renowned underwriter, the 
issuing business sends a signal of reduced uncertainty (Carter and Manaster, 1990). Underpricing, on 
the other hand, is the fault of respectable underwriters and their syndicate, which includes co-lead 
managers and analysts (Dimovski et al., 2010). In comparison to the non-US sample of research, we 
suggest that the presence of analysts in the underwriters' syndicate enhances investors' trust in the 
US IPO. Because US authorities prohibit early research and its dissemination to the public in order to 
minimize manipulations by the underwriters' syndicate, the presence of analysts prior to the issuance 
of the IPO instils trust in the investor, resulting in increased demand for the share on the IPO's listing 





PRESENCE OF ANALYSTS BEFORE IPO AND UNDERPRICING 
The purpose of this article is to assess the impact of the IPO's pre-issue analyst presence on the IPO's 
early results. As a result, our research question is: What are the drivers of underpricing of shares in an 
IPO when analysts are present prior to the IPO's release? We utilized meta-analysis on the twelve 
papers to answer this question where one of the independent factors is the existence of an analyst 
prior to the issue and the dependent variable is underpricing and its influence on the variable 
"underpricing" was found In this study, the possible endogeneity between the variables underpricing 
and pre-issue analyst presence is not a reason for worry because underpricing of IPOs happens only 
on the first day of the IPO (Sahoo, 2014). 
Daily et al. (2003) were the first to do a meta-analysis on underpricing in IPO research. More general 
determinants of underpricing were proposed in their work. Our method differs from theirs in that we 
have incorporated pre-issue analyst presence in the underwriter’s syndicate, which is a new variable, 
and assess its impact on IPO underpricing in the meta-analysis methodology. We make two 
contributions to the literature. First, regardless of whether the sample is US or non-US (developing 
market), this study is a first attempt to assess the effect size of analyst presence and its relationship 
with IPO underpricing. 
Second, Daily et al., (2003) evaluated the impact sizes of several factors on underpricing and 
concluded that these effect sizes were effective. We take a step further by including meta-regression 
into our investigation of the effect magnitude of analyst presence on underpricing. We have added 
variables in the meta-regression, such as industry dummy and age of issuing business, the assets and 
share overhang of the issuing firm, the underwriter repute, and the country dummy for US and 
developing market data. The moderating variables are selected based on their proximity to the 
presence of analysts covering the business. For example, an associated analyst typically covers the 
company from whom they receive positive information (Lin and McNichols, 1998). Such businesses 
have reputed underwriters insuring them, are mature in terms of age, and have significant asset 
values. As a result, it is necessary to control these factors and determine their moderating influence 
in order to explain the magnitude of the relationship between analyst presence and IPO 
underpricing. 
The meta-analysis results reveal that there is a substantial and positive link between pre-issue analyst 
presence and underpricing, which is around 4.9 percent. The presence of security analysts prior to 
the release of a product causes underpricing and contradicts the idea that security analysts 
contribute to informational efficiency. According to this idea, the presence of high-quality analysts 
covering the firm's IPO prior to the issuance increases informational efficiency. Increased information 
quality caused by pre-issue analyst presence should eventually minimize underpricing on the first day 
of the sale.  
Our study, on the other hand, asks a very pertinent question: "Why does pre-issue analyst presence 
raise money left on the table for the issuing firm?" We addressed this topic by splitting the sample into 
US and emerging market data and determining the magnitude of the effect of analyst presence on 
underpricing on both data sets. The positive, significant, and larger-than-average effect size of the 
US sample, indicating increased underpricing owing to the presence of analysts in the underwriter's 
syndicate, demonstrates information asymmetry in the US IPO markets. This is due to the restrictions 
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Furthermore, meta-regression results reveal that underwriter reputation has a positive and substantial 
impact on effect magnitude, implying that underwriting reputation moderates the effect of pre-issue 
analyst presence and enhances underpricing for the IPOs covered by the analyst. For the research 
utilizing US data, the results show that IPO underwriter reputation is significant in attracting pre-issue 
analyst presence, which further enhances skewed pricing of an IPO on the first day of the offering. 
The existence of a renowned underwriter as a mediator between analyst presence and emerging 
market data is important for emerging market data. Furthermore, underpricing the IPO has a 
negligible negative impact. The findings show that the presence of a renowned underwriter in a 
developing market IPO reduces information asymmetry and enhances market efficiency, which 
helps the issuing business by preventing money from being left on the table. 
The following is the structure of this document. Section 2 discusses the primary literature on 
underpricing and pre-issue analyst presence. Section 3 demonstrates the study's data gathering and 
methodology. Section 4 displays the findings of the meta-analysis. Section 4 discusses the outcome. 
Section 5 brings the research to a close. 
2. Review of literature 
 
The discrepancy between the offer price and the first day closing price of the share when it is traded 
in the secondary market is the underpricing of the shares issued in the original offering. On average, 
Reilly and Hatfield (1969), McDonald and Fisher (1972), and Bear and Curley (1975) found that initial 
public offerings performed well on the first day. Ibbotson (1975) discovered that the positive return 
on the first day was 11.4 percent, indicating that the IPO was underpriced. With the assumption of 
information asymmetry, Baron (1982) presented a model to explain the underpricing of the IPO. He 
ascribed the underpricing to the issuer's failure to oversee the underwriter's distribution activities, 
which results in lower offer prices on a listing day, resulting in underpricing. 
 
Underpricing or anomalous first-day returns have been investigated as a predictive variable in the 
literature following the listing of the IPO (Rajan and Servaes (1997), Aggarwal et al (2002), Cliff and 
Dennis (2004), Gwilym and Verousis (2009), Bourzoita et al (2015)). Aside from that, another set of 
studies exists in which IPO underpricing is extensively investigated as a result of factors, for example, 
offer price changes, pre-issue analyst presence, underwriter preferences (agency problem), 
reputation and characteristics, venture capitalist presence, lead-manager reputation, star analyst 
presence, company industry characteristics (Cliff and Dennis (2004), Arnold et al, (2010), Adjasi et al 
(2011), Alanazi and Al-Zoubi (2015), Bradley et al (2015), Chourou et al (2018), Fullbrunn et al (2019), 
Jia et al (2019), Boulton et al (2020),). 
 
According to Chang et al. (2016), the cause for IPO underwriting is an agency problem between the 
underwriter and the issuer. They emphasized the underwriter's authority as a result of the book 
building technique, in which they have complete control over the price. By displaying control, 
underwriters achieve their aim of attracting the most attention from institutional and retail investors 
for the IPO. Their gain is a decrease in subscription risk and an increase in commission by allocating 
underpriced shares to institutions or their clients (Loughran and Ritter, 2002).  
 
Furthermore, by partially adjusting the offer price, underwriters attempt to reconcile the issuer's 
expectation of maximum issue proceeds with their own aims, as stated above. Benveniste and Spindt 
(1989) provided an alternative perspective on balance. They argue that underwriters analyze the 
IPO's demand with the aid of information providers on a certain offer price and then modify the price 
partially upwards to pass on the advantage to the issuer and the difference in the form of 
underpricing to provide the information providers monetary profits. Thus, underwriters are IPO price 
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The presence of top analysts and respected lead managers in the venture capital company also 
contributes to underpricing. The underwriting syndicate idea was proposed by Bradley et al. (2015). 
They discussed the relationship between the lead manager, co-manager, and underwriter and 
emphasized the ease with which businesses supported by prominent venture capitalists may obtain 
analyst presence when underpricing is high. Furthermore, the firm's IPO is underpriced if it is backed 
by top venture capitalists, indicating underplay between the underwriter and its associates, as 
observed by Liu and Ritter (2010) as a spinning hypothesis, and is consistent with the hot IPO chase 
by the star analyst, as proposed by Loughran and Ritter (2004) and further examined by Cliff and 
Denis (2004) and Liu and Ritter (2011). 
  
In addition to post-IPO analyst coverage, which is a consequence of underpricing as represented in 
the analyst lust theory, pre-issue analyst coverage is another predictor of IPO underpricing in the 
literature. Jia, Xie, and Zhang (2014) discovered, using data from Chinese IPOs from 2006 to 2012, 
that pre-IPO research and coverage increases the likelihood of offer price adjustments and positive 
sentiment. The study's most interesting finding was a negative relationship between offer price 
revisions and first-day returns, which Jia et al. (2014) attributed to pro-rata allocation rules different 
from those used in US IPOs, which prohibit underwriters from allocating underpriced shares to their 
associates, ensuring that pre-IPO analyst research is fully incorporated into the IPO price.  
 
The link between offer price revisions and underpricing is paradoxical due to varied IPO guidelines in 
developing and developed financial markets. As a result, it is worth noting the relationship between 
the presence of analysts in the underwriter's syndicate (covering the business before or post-IPO) and 
underpricing in both US and developing market studies. 
  
Investors and financial markets benefit from the analyst role in information sharing. This is what one 
section of the literature claims. Ivakovic and Jegadeesh (2004), for example, argue that the analyst 
discovers the private information and analyses the released information. As a result, analysts create 
a more favorable information environment in which private and public information flows effectively 
from the firm to the investors. Another body of work challenges the information efficiency theory in 
relation to analysts. For example, both affiliated and unaffiliated analysts provide pre-issue IPO 
research and IPO presence. The presence of affiliated analysts covering the firm's pre-issue IPO may 
be owing to the underwriter's need, and therefore in the literature, it is clear that this presence might 
offer investors skewed signals.  
 
According to Michaely and Womack (1999), underwriter analysts (associated analysts) offer more 
skewed signals to investors than unaffiliated analysts. Concurrent with this discovery, Degeorge (2007) 
stated that issuers pay for the positive presence of linked and unaffiliated analysts, resulting in skewed 
signals. As a result, unaffiliated analysts may contribute to the information inefficiency that affects 
IPO price discovery and may result in underpricing. Hence, the literature contains evidence of biased 
recommendations from both affiliated and unaffiliated experts.  
 
He and Lin (2015) provided evidence of a reduction in information asymmetry as well as an 
improvement in information precision to support the information efficiency theory connected to 
analyst following. According to Baron, IPO underpricing is an anomalous event caused by the 
uncertainty produced by information asymmetry (1982). Underpricing is likely to reduce as a result of 
the pre-issue analyst involvement in the IPO. Sahoo (2014) examined 157 IPOs in India from 2007 to 
2012 and discovered a negative link between IPO underpricing and analyst pre-issue IPO presence.  
 
Jia et al. (2019) discovered, with identical results, that analysts' pre-issue presence reduces early 
returns. Wang (2008) compared underpricing in three different nations. They discovered less 
underpricing in Hong Kong IPOs when compared to US and Singapore IPOs, and they ascribed the 
difference to the fact that pre-issue IPO research is permitted in Hong Kong but not in the other two 
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co-lead managers covering the IPO and the IPO's first-day results. They claimed that increasing the 
presence of co-lead managers might reduce underpricing evidence by lowering the IPO's early 
returns. 
  
Some evidence contradicts the unfavorable link between pre-IPO research and underpricing. 
According to Loughran and Ritter (2004) and Liu and Ritter (2011), the inclusion of star analysts and 
respected underwriters in the team causes the IPO to be underpriced. As a result of their findings, 
they provided the first proof of analyst lust theory, which explains the tendency of venture capital-
backed businesses to have a thirst for star analyst coverage of an underpriced IPO. Kennedy et al. 
(2006) show that as the number of co-lead managers grows in IPOs, so does the underpricing. 
According to Loughran and Ritter (2004), co-lead managers are members of the underwriter's 
syndicate and offer research coverage for the IPO. As a result, their research coverage is biased 
toward the buy-side, creating upward momentum for the share price on the first day of trade, 
leading in IPO underpricing.  
 
Jeon et al. (2015) discovered much decreased underpricing as a result of several underwriters 
handling the problem. They documented the idea in contrast to Hu and Ritter's (2007) tradeoff 
argument, which focuses on increasing the number of underwriters to enhance visibility at the 
expense of increasing underpricing. However, the amount of underpricing reported by them is 
proportional to the quantity of analysts covering the problem. Furthermore, Dambra et al. 
demonstrated an improvement in a firm's visibility at the expense of underpricing (2018). They 
contend that an increase in analyst pre-IPO presence enhances investor confidence, resulting in 
greater volume and price momentum post-IPO. Eventually, greater investor confidence leads to 
increased underpricing. Furthermore, Massa and Zhang (2020) demonstrated the favorable link 
between underpricing and the existence of a star analyst. 
  
There is conflicting data about the relationship between pre-IPO analyst presence and underpricing. 
As a result, further research is required to answer the question: Is the presence of a pre-issue analyst 
significantly connected to underpricing? Is there a good or negative influence of pre-issue analyst 
presence on underpricing? Concurrent with these study questions, our research hypothesis is: “The 
existence of pre-issue analyst presence has an influence on underpricing.” Furthermore, we contend 
that underpricing caused by pre-issue analyst involvement is mitigated by underwriter repute and 
the presence of venture capitalists, the assets and age of the firm, the industry characteristics, and 
the nation from where the data was taken. In anticipation of future advantages, the firm's underwriter 
reputation draws analyst presence (Loughran and Ritter, 2004). 
 
3. Data and methodology 
 
3.1 Selection of data 
Cooper (1982) recommended descendency technique is used by us. In this method, all of the articles 
that are cited central to the issue are retrieved and then evaluated for relevancy to the main 
concept. This procedure is repeated until the search is completed. 
 
We examined three databases for relevant studies: Science Direct, Scopus, and Clarivate. The term 
"underpricing" yielded almost 2000 items across all three databases. The papers were then shortlisted 
based on these criteria: 
1. Underpricing, first day returns or beginning returns are retained as a dependent variable in the 
model, whereas pre-issue analyst presence is an independent variable or belongs to a control 
group of variables. 
2. To eliminate the publishing bias proposed by Cooper, studies are chosen regardless of the 
importance of the influence of the independent variable on the dependent variable (1982). 
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3.2 Sample Size 
After applying the criteria, we chose twelve papers that matched the goal of the meta-analysis. In 
all of the research, the sample period begins in the year 2000. 
 
3.3 Methodology 
In this work, we have utilized meta-analysis to determine the cumulative effect size of pre-issue 
analyst presence as an independent variable on the dependent variable, IPO underpricing. The 
analysis of the analysis is known as meta-analysis (Glass, 1970). It is a quantitative approach for 
determining the empirical aggregate effect of a predictor variable on a dependent variable based 
on the findings of many studies. Furthermore, unlike qualitative evaluations, the technique 
successfully captures heterogeneity (Light, 1984). The aggregate link between the two variables is 
evaluated using the variable's correlation coefficient and the sign of the correlation coefficient in 
this technique. The Fisher’s z-transformation method is used to convert the correlation coefficient to 
its impact magnitude (Hedges and Olkin, 1985). Another approach for determining effect magnitude 
is to compute the weighted mean of correlation coefficients (Hunter and Schimdt, 1990). 
 
In this study, we are interested in the beta coefficients and t-values of the regression model that 
relates IPO underpricing with pre-issue analyst presence in various studies. For instance, a regression 
model is: 
Underpricing = 0 1β β+ ×  pre-issue analyst presence + e 
 
We use Doucouliagos (1995) to convert beta coefficients, such as 1, into partial regression 
coefficients. This technique offers an advantage over Hedges and Olkin's (1985) method of 
estimating effect magnitude using correlation coefficients. By converting the beta coefficients as 
partial regression coefficients, it is simple to compare beta coefficients at scale (PRC). Furthermore, 
PRC checks the misspecification bias in the model by investigating variations in estimating models 
and control variables (Hang et.al., 2018).  
 
PRC is calculated with the t-value or p-value of the coefficient by this formula: 
 









, Where d is the degrees of freedom and is 
equal to n-p-1 (n is a number of observations, p is the number of independent variables). 
Additionally, we calculate standard error as: 
 






The calculation of the PRC or the effect size from all twelve trials allows for a comparison of the 
correlation between the two variables (underpricing and pre-issue analyst presence), as the 
correlation is determined while all other factors are held constant. After calculating the PRC or effect 
size for each of the twelve studies, we average them to produce the overall effect size, which we 
then estimate.  
 
Using the random effect model, we estimate the combined effect size for twelve research. In meta-
analysis, the random effect model corrects for sample size bias (or between-study variance) by 
providing weights that are adjusted for between-study variation in addition to within-study variation. 
As a result, all the weights assigned to the individual studies have been changed to account for any 
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size will be given more weight and will differ considerably from the other small sample studies 
(Borenstein et al., 2010). However, under the random effect model, the weights will now be lowered 
downwards by the between-study variance component to balance the large sample study's overall 
dominance. 
The random effect model estimates random fluctuations in each research to compute its 
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These effect sizes are transformed to Fisher-transformed z-score Standard error which calculated by 
















        
 
Table 1: Summary of Variables as Covariates in the Meta-regression 
Variable  Working definition Type References 
Industry Industry dummy is used in the studies to control for the industry effects. 
Binary: 1 if study controls for 
this variable, 0 otherwise 
How and Low 
(1993) 
Year Year dummy is used in the studies to control for the year effects. 
Binary: 1 if study controls for 
this variable, 0 otherwise  Tomzyck (1996) 
Age Age dummy is used in the studies to control for the age of the firm. 
Binary: 1 if study controls for 
this variable, 0 otherwise  Jaitly (2004) 
Underwriter’s 
Reputation 
Underwriter reputation dummy is 
used in the studies to control for the 
reputation effects. 
Binary: 1 if study controls for 




Asset dummy is used in the studies to 
control for the effects raised by 
assets of IPO firms. 
Binary: 1 if study controls for 




Overhang dummy is used in the 
studies to control for the effect 
created by ownership of the shares 
post-IPO by the owners (If they 
choose not to sell their stake on the 
listing day). 
Binary: 1 if study controls for 





VC dummy is used in the studies to 
control for the VC effects. 
Binary: 1 if study controls for 
this variable, 0 otherwise Barry et. al., (1990) 
Country 
Country dummy is used in the studies 
to control for the effects raised by US 
or the emerging market studies. 
Binary: 1 if study controls for 
this variable, 0 otherwise 
Chowdhry and 
Sherman (1996) 
Note: This table contains a summary of the covariates used in the meta regression. The variables are all binary. Their citations 






PRESENCE OF ANALYSTS BEFORE IPO AND UNDERPRICING 
The factors mentioned in Table 1 are used as control variables in the meta-regression, and the 
average effect size is used as the dependent variable. The link between underpricing and pre-issue 
analyst presence is influenced by the control factors. As a result, it is recommended to do meta-
regression using these control variables to identify the real influence of underlying research variables. 
Underwriter reputation, for example, is a control variable that influences underpricing on the listing 
day. As a result, we account for this variable to see if it has a moderating influence on the link 
between pre-issue analyst presence and underpricing.  
 
Similarly, we account for factors such as industry, year, age, asset, overhang, and nation. As a 
control variable in the research under consideration, these variables are assigned the categorical 
values "0" for absence and "1" for presence (Klona, 2021). This is owing to a lack of continuous data 
for these variables in these twelve studies. For example, in most studies, the asset is indicated as a 
control variable, but its value is not clearly stated in the study articles. Similarly, overhang is assigned 
a value of "1" in meta regression as a covariate indicating the controlling impact of this variable in 
the twelve research, we selected for meta-analysis to determine whether it may alter pre-issue 
analyst presence to minimize underpricing. 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
 
4.1 Meta-analysis 
Using a random effect model using data from 12 studies and 12 effect sizes and a total of close to 
20,400 observations, the overall effect size is 4.9 percent and significant with a p-value of 0.017 (Table-
2). The study's between-study variation is high, showing that factors have a moderating effect on the 
link between pre-issue analyst presence and underpricing. The heterogeneity test, which yields a Q-
value of 95.437, further supports the moderating impact on the underpricing and analyst presence 
connection. This number indicates that the homogeneity null hypothesis is rejected. Furthermore, the 
p-value for the chi-squared test for homogeneity is 0.000, and the I-squared value is 88.5 percent 
(Table-2) suggesting heterogeneity, indicating that 88.5 percent of the observed variance in the 
studies is attributable to the variables in the studies. 
 
Table 2: The Meta-Analysis Displaying the Impact Size Data for Twelve Individual Studies 
Study name Sample size Effect size t-value weight% 
Cliff (2004) 1050 0.07* 2.18 8.70 
Kennedy (2006) 2381 0.06** 2.75 9.81 
Deng (2008) 194 0.15** 1.96 4.27 
Wang (2008) 1168 0.05 1.728 8.85 
Liu (2011) 4510 0.04** 2.63 10.28 
Jia (2014) 1093 0.03** 2.6 10.46 
Sahoo (2014) 157 0.19** 2.306 3.88 
Bradley (2015) 4180 0.05*** 3.292 10.26 
Jeon (2015) 631 0.02 0.494 8.06 
Dambra (2018) 363 0.14** 3.07 7.12 
Massa(2020) 3949 0.05** 3.05 10.21 
Ma (2020) 781 0.32*** 9.4 8.11 
I-V pooled ES  0.049** 2.39 100.00 
Heterogeneity Chi-squared   =                    95.47 (df=11, p-value= 0) 
I-squared = 88.5% (variations due to heterogeneity)  
Note: This table shows the effect size data of all the twelve studies. The symbols *, **, and *** in the table denote significance 
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As the data demonstrate, pre-issue analyst presence enhances underpricing of IPOs. This conclusion 
is consistent with Deng and Dorfleitner's (2008) and He and Lin's (2015) findings, which support the 
concept of greater first-day returns due to analysts' pre-issue presence. The cause for this outcome 
might be attributed to the issue's co-biased manager's recommendation to the purchase side, or to 
the analysts present in the underwriter's syndicate (Loughran and Ritter, 2004). This skewed 
information produces information asymmetry, which results in greater early returns for the share due 
to its larger demand bias. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the contribution of each research to the overall conclusion using a forest plot. The 
size of the sample is shown by the black vertical line in the forest plot for each research, and the 
confidence interval is indicated by the horizontal line. The vertical line at the bottom of the picture 
depicts the overall effect size and its importance since it intersects the interval's midpoint. This 
discovery is connected to the considerable influence of analyst presence before to issuance on 
underpricing. The total confidence interval of the effect magnitude is shown by the length horizontal 
line. 
 
Figure1: Forest Plot  
Note: This figure depicts the contribution of each study to the calculation of the cumulative effect size. Horizontal line shows 
the confidence interval and vertical small line shows effect size of the study. 
 
The vertical line at the bottom of the picture depicts the overall effect size and its importance since 
it intersects the interval's midpoint. This discovery is connected to the considerable influence of 
analyst presence before to issuance on underpricing. The total confidence interval of the effect 
magnitude is shown by the length horizontal line. The total impact size of analyst presence on 
underpricing is positive and significant in the US sample of research, at 1%.  
Table-3 shows that the effect magnitude is given as 5%. The impact size in the developing market 
sample is smaller, at 1.3 percent, and negligible (see Table-4). This conclusion is intriguing, and one 
of the explanations might be the homogeneity of the US study population. The reported I-squared 
for US studies is low (0.04%, Table-3), indicating that the observed variance in US studies is not related 
to between-study variation. The observed variance in emerging market research, however, is due to 
between-study variation, since I-squared is 97.59 percent, showing significant heterogeneity in 







PRESENCE OF ANALYSTS BEFORE IPO AND UNDERPRICING 
Table 3: Meta-Analysis Results Showing the Effect Size Data for Six US IPO Studies 
Study name Sample size Effect size t-value weight% 
Liu (2011) 4510 0.039** 2.63 33.35 
Bradley (2015) 4180 0.05*** 3.292 31.83 
Kennedy (2006) 2381 0.056** 2.75 17.72 
Jeon (2015) 631 0.018 0.494 5.52 
Dambra (2018) 363 0.136*** 3.07 3.80 
Cliff (2004) 1050 0.067 2.18 7.79 
I-V pooled ES  0.050***  100.00 
I-squared = 0.04%   
Note: This table shows the effect size data of six non-US studies. The symbols *, **, and *** in the table denote significance levels 
of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Table 4: Meta-Analysis Results Showing the Effect Size Data for Six US IPO Studies 
Study name Sample size Effect size t-value weight% 
Jia (2014) 1093 0.032 2.6 18.02 
Sahoo (2014) 157 -0.187 2.306 14.38 
Ma (2020) 781 0.320 9.4 17.39 
Wang (2008) 1168 -0.050 1.728 17.51 
Massa(2020) 3949 0.048 3.05 17.95 
Deng (2008) 194 -0.148 1.96 14.75 
I-V pooled ES  0.013***  100.00 
I-squared = 0.04%   
Note: Table shows the effect size data of six US studies. The symbols *, **, and *** in the table denote significance levels of 10%, 
5%, and 1%, respectively. 
The disparity in outcomes between US and developing market research can be ascribed to below 
mentioned factor. The developed markets, for example, have established companies with a defined 
capital structure. As a result, the underwriter or book manager may properly evaluate the issuing 
business and establish the offer price to attract the appropriate attention from stock analysts and 
prospective investors following the IPO.  
 
In contrast, in emerging market firms, the capital structure is less effective and the determinants of it 
are not precisely known, making them slightly riskier to value (Eldomiaty, 2008), making it difficult for 
the underwriter or book manager to estimate the intrinsic value of the firm's IPO and thus the offer 
price. In this instance, high-risk businesses may engage reputed underwriters, resulting in a larger pre-
issue analyst presence, which decreases underpricing (Bowen et al, 2008). 
 
Figure 2 depicts a funnel plot used to determine the presence of publication bias in a meta-analysis. 
This figure identifies the bias in the meta-analysis caused by unpublished studies with negligible p-
values (Harbord et al, 2006). The standard error is represented on the y axis of the funnel plot in Figure-
2, and the effect size estimate is shown on the x axis of each study. The figure clearly shows that the 
studies with the highest weight converge to the pooled estimate, which is at the top of the curve. 
Nonetheless, three investigations are located outside the plot's left boundary. They are, nevertheless, 
far closer to the confidence limits. One research is outside the funnel plot's right bounds and also 
farther away from it. This demonstrates the presence of publication bias in these four papers, and we 
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Figure 2: Funnel Plot 
 
Note: This is a plot of standard error vs Fisher's z-score. Studies that are outside of the left and right margins add to the 
publication bias. 
 
The small study bias test illustrates the variation in findings between small and big studies owing to 
differences in research quality. Egger's test (Egger et al., 1997) was employed for this (see Table-5). 
The null hypothesis states that no small study bias exists. The two-tailed p-value is 0.96, and we are 
unable to reject the null hypothesis, indicating that this study is free of small study bias. As a result, 
despite the evidence of publication bias in four studies in our study, Egger's test revealed that the 
divergence of four studies from the confidence limits is attributable to other reasons. 
 
Table 5: Egger’s Test for the Identification of Small Study Bias 
Intercept 0.07805 
standard error 1.884 
t-value 0.04 




Meta-regression is carried out with study-specific characteristics serving as control variables (see 
Table-1) and the cumulative effect size of twelve studies serving as the dependent variable. We 
computed the Hausman's test in all three models, model-1, model-2, and model-3, to check for any 
confounding effect or enodogeneity in the regression model (see Table-6).  
 
Table-6 Meta regression results for three models 
To estimate the coefficients in the Meta regression, the random effect (RE) model is employed. Meta 
regression is carried out with the dependent variable being effect size and the independent variables 
being study level characteristics. All the explanatory variables in the research are binary, with values 
1 and 0 indicating their existence or absence. The symbols *, **, and *** in the table denote 
significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 



















PRESENCE OF ANALYSTS BEFORE IPO AND UNDERPRICING 
Variable Model-1 Model-2 Model-3 
Intercept -0.25*** -0.23** -0.24** 
Industry -0.19* -0.21* -0.21* 
Year  0.3***  0.29***  0.29*** 
Age  0.14*  0.12  0.12 
Underwriter reputation  0.12**  0.13**  0.12** 
Asset   0.03  0.02 
Overhang  0.11  0.09  0.1 
VC    0.02 
Country  0.09  0.08  0.09 
N  12  12  12 
Hausman’s test p-value  0.59  0.68  0.77 
Model  RE  RE  RE 
Adj R2  0.64  0.65  0.66 
Model validity Yes, at p-value= 0.02 Yes, at p-value=0.03 Yes, at p-value=0.04 
Goodness of fit Yes, at p-value= 0.000 Yes, at p-value=0.000 Yes, at p-value=0.000 
 
We test the null hypothesis that there is no systematic difference between the Fixed and Random 
effect model coefficients. We fail to reject the null hypothesis since the estimated p-value is 0.59 for 
model-1, 0.68 for model-2 and 0.77 for model-3. This demonstrates the lack of endogeneity in the 
three models we estimate. As a result, we employ the random effects model to estimate the 
coefficients in the three models. 
 
Table-6 shows the estimates of the coefficients by applying the random effects model. Year, industry, 
and underwriter repute are all significant variables in all the model specifications, i.e., model-1, 
model-2, and model-3. When all variables, except asset and VC, are included in the model, the 
underwriter's reputation is significant at the 5% level of significance. 
 
The industry and year fixed effects covariate are both significant. As a result, the industry and year 
variables in the research are sources of heterogeneity and moderate the relationship between pre-
issue analyst presence and IPO underpricing. The negative sign of the coefficient of the industry 
variable indicates that when the research study controls for industry fixed effects, the impact of 
analysts' presence prior to the IPO on underpricing is reduced. The reduction in effect size as a result 
of industry effect as a control variable demonstrates that it can lead to improved efficiency in 
information transmission since it adjusts for price clustering in the given industry (Cao and Shi, 2006) 
and therefore lowers underpricing.  
In research that adjusts for years fixed effects in the regression model, the effect magnitude is greater. 
Underpricing is a transient phenomenon that is highly dependent on market conditions. Increased 
effect size in research controlling for year fixed effects shows that in a short period of time, ignoring 
external economic fixed effects, pre-issue analyst coverage has the tendency to distort the pricing 
of the IPO. Significance of underwriter reputation, with a p-value of 0.0396 and a positive effect size 
of 0.12, demonstrates that underwriter reputation increases the influence of pre-issue analyst 
presence on IPO underpricing. These findings are consistent with those of Beatty and Welch (1996) 
and Loughran and Ritter (2004), who showed a positive correlation between underwriter reputation 
and IPO underpricing. To comprehend the beneficial impact of underwriter reputation on effect size, 
we must first appreciate the link between underwriter reputation and IPO analysts.   
 
Reputable underwriters attract analysts to follow the firm's IPO, and analysts begin making 
recommendations prior to the IPO listing day; the observation that the underwriter's reputation has a 
beneficial influence on the effect size shows the issue's enthusiasm among investors. This generates 
excitement for the IPO among investors, who are drawn to the issue in order to raise its subscription. 
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hypothesis (Loughran and Ritter, 2004). Furthermore, the issuer's willingness to leave money on the 
table is related to confirming long-term investor relationships as well as success in attracting 
uninformed investors (Beatty, 1986).  
 
6. Conclusion 
The meta-analysis of the twelve studies has assisted in identifying the aggregate effect of pre-issue 
analyst presence and its role in IPO underpricing. The link between them is ambiguous in the literature. 
The meta-analysis reveals that the total effect size of the twelve studies is substantial and favourable. 
The extent of the favourable effect implies that IPO underpricing has increased as a result of pre-IPO 
analyst presence. As a result, rather than creating a more efficient information environment for 
investors, the presence of analysts prior to the IPO causes an information gap, resulting in over-hyping 
of the issue and higher initial returns on the first day of issue.  This finding is also consistent with the 
spinning hypothesis, which promotes underpricing as a method of rewarding venture capitalists or 
other early investors and advocates for the inclusion of reputable underwriters in the IPO process. 
Furthermore, statistics from US IPOs suggest that analyst presence has a significant impact on IPO 
underpricing. Due to the variability in their research, the impact size of the connection between 
analyst presence covering the business and underpricing in emerging market’s IPOs is smaller but not 
negligible. The homogeneity of research in the United States and the heterogeneity of the 
developing market sample is attributed to this result. The reason for the disparity in their conclusions 
is due to differences between researchers, which may be related to the difficulty that IPO analysts or 
issue underwriters may have while valuing the business. As a result of their varying levels of capital 
market maturity, emerging market businesses exhibit heterogeneity in their outcomes.  As a result, this 
study is effective in isolating the influence of nation as a covariate. 
Moreover, the reputation of the underwriters amplifies the effect of analyst presence on IPO 
underpricing. The underwriter's reputation has an overall favourable and substantial influence on the 
link between analyst coverage and IPO underpricing, according to the moderation analysis of the 
variables on effect size. As a consequence, reputable underwriters have demonstrated the impact 
of analysts' presence prior to the underpricing of the IPO. As a result, the finding validates the 
information asymmetry theory for the issuing business, which depicts the IPO underpricing as a result 
of price manipulation by the underwriter and its syndicate, which includes analysts. More research is 
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